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THE DISPARITY OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE  
AMONG SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN VIETNAM 
 
Abstract 
 
Fiscal decentralisation has attracted attention from government, academic studies, and 
international institutions with the aims of enhancing economic growth in recent years. One 
of the difficult issues is to measure satisfactorily the degree of fiscal decentralisation across 
countries. Vo (2010) developed the fiscal decentralisation index, the first of its kind, which 
accounts for both fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments. We 
argue that while Vo’s index is an advance on current practice, it is still not perfect as it 
assumes there is no dispersion of revenue and expenditure across regions. In response to 
this weakness, fiscal entropy and fiscal inequality measures are developed using 
information theory (Theil, 1967). It is shown how fiscal inequality can be decomposed 
regionally and hierarchically. These ideas are illustrated with an emerging country data -
Vietnam - pertaining to the national, provincial and local levels of governments. 
 
Key words: Autonomy; Fiscal Decentralisation Index; Theil’s entropy; Vietnam 
JEL Classification Numbers:   H77 
 
December 2018 
 2 
1. Introduction 
The term “fiscal decentralisation” refers to the devolution of authority for public 
finances and the delivery of government services from the national to subnational levels 
(Tanzi, 1996). This devolution is related to the four main interrelationships among levels of 
government regarding fiscal issues, viz., the responsibility for (i) expenditure decisions; (ii) 
taxing and revenue-raising powers; (iii) subnational borrowings; and (iv) intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers. Fiscal decentralisation is currently an issue of considerable practical 
importance facing many developing economies and has been advocated by international 
economic bodies, such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (World Bank, 2003). Moreover, the academic study of fiscal 
decentralisation is a field of vigorous research activity and a number of attempts have been 
made to systematically understand the key economic principles of this area (see, e.g., Bird, 
2004; Boadway, 2003; Collins, 2001; McLure, 1998).  
 In recent decades, fiscal decentralisation has become a central concern in countries 
around the world, especially in developing nations such as Argentina, Bolvia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, and Nigeria; and countries in transition such as 
Bulgaria, China, Hungary, and Russian Federation (IMF, 1997; Bird, 1993). Fiscal 
arrangements among levels of government have been reformed in a manner that increases 
the extent to which SNGs are assigned more expenditure and revenue-raising 
responsibilities. There is, however, a lack of a widely-accepted tool to measure the degree 
of fiscal decentralisation across countries. 
To date, measurement of fiscal decentralisation in studies of public finances has been 
very crude. Typically, either revenue or expenditure from subnational governments 
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(“SNGs”) has been employed without taking into account the fiscal autonomy of lower 
level governments. For example, in his pioneering study, Oates (1972) used the national 
government share in total public revenue as the degree of fiscal centralisation. Woller and 
Phillips (1998) measured fiscal decentralisation in four different ways such as the ratio of 
local government revenues to total government revenues or the ratio of local government 
revenues less grants-in-aid to total government revenues, for example. Similarly, Davoodi 
and Zou (1998) measured the level of fiscal decentralisation as the spending by SNGs as a 
fraction of total government spending. It is widely accepted that measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation in previous works has been undertaken on a superficial basis. There has 
been no recognition of the important distinction between subnational “revenue” and own 
sourced revenue over which subnational jurisdictions have policy autonomy. Many 
previous attempts to measure the degree of fiscal decentralisation involve the use of some 
form of share of revenue/expenditure at lower-level jurisdictions in the national total.   
 Martinez-Vazquez et. al. (2016) argued that one crucial and yet unsolved issues in the 
empirical literature on decentralization is the proper measurement of decentralization itself.  
In one of the most recent papers on measuring fiscal decentralisation, Liu et al. (2017) 
measured the degree of fiscal decentralization in the Chinese provinces by simultaneously 
considering expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization. The authors argued 
that of these two indicators, expenditure decentralization, defined as the local share of total 
government expenditure has been widely used in previous empirical studies. 
 In his innovative approach, Vo (2009, 2010) developed the fiscal decentralisation 
index, the first of its kind, by considering two fundamental issues of fiscal federalism: (i) 
fiscal autonomy; and (ii) fiscal importance of subnational governments. We argue that 
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while Vo’s index is an advance on current practice, it is the claim of this paper that such an 
approach is inadequate as it completely ignores important distributional aspects of fiscal 
arrangements. Consider two hypothetical economies, A and B.  In both economies, 
government spending and revenue at the national level accounts for 50 percent of the total, 
so that the remaining 50 percent is the responsibility of subnational government.  The 
difference is that in A there are only two large subnational institutions that have an equal 
share of the total 50 percent; while in B there are 100 subnational units, each accounting for 
1 percent of the 50 percent total.  It is clear that there is substantially more fiscal 
decentralisation in B as compared to A.  However, an exclusive focus of the split of the 
total between the national and subnational levels would lead one to erroneously conclude 
that both economies exhibit the same degree of fiscal decentralisation.  In other words, both 
the first and second moments of the distribution of revenue/expenditure are important for 
understanding the workings of fiscal arrangements. In this paper, we develop measures of 
the dispersion of revenue and expenditure using ideas from information theory. 
2. Fiscal autonomy and Fiscal importance of subnational governments 
2.1 Fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
Agreement on the distribution of taxing powers is difficult since the public-sector 
players (national government and SNGs) approach their respective powers from two 
different perspectives. While the national government continues keeping important tax 
sources for economic stabilisation and income redistribution, SNGs typically focus on 
taxing powers to generate revenue to fund their provision of services which are 
fundamental to community welfare such as healthcare, education and public order. When 
the assignment of tax bases across levels of governments is extensive, the gap between 
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spending responsibility and taxing power of SNGs will be minimal, leading to a high 
degree of fiscal autonomy of SNGs. Fiscal autonomy of SNGs implies that, to some extent, 
SNGs can arrange their own sourced revenue by exercising their taxing powers to cover 
costs occurring in the provision of public goods and services. In such circumstances, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers will not represent a significant source of revenue for 
SNGs. It should be noted that, however, even in the absence of fiscal transfers (“grants”), 
SNGs will not enjoy full fiscal autonomy if they receive taxes or shares from revenue bases 
directly controlled and defined by the national government (McLure, 2001). The necessary 
condition for a significant level of fiscal autonomy is that SNGs themselves have the 
discretion to set the tax rates and/ or bases (so that they can adjust their revenue by varying 
the rates and/ or the bases) in response to fiscal demand for publicly provided services. If 
this is not the case, flexibility and the potential for creativity by SNGs for the efficient 
provision of public goods and services are limited.   
In the event of a long-period mismatch between SNGs’ spending responsibility and 
revenue capacity, vertical fiscal imbalance will inevitably emerge and must be managed by 
the national government through intergovernmental fiscal grants and advances. If SNGs are 
given adequate fiscal autonomy, ex-post vertical fiscal imbalance is expected to be 
minimised before any fiscal transfer takes place. However, it is also argued that if the 
national government focuses exclusively on filling the gap of vertical fiscal issues, this 
decision may reduce the incentive for the SNGs to increase their respective taxing powers 
and to manage public spending efficiently (Ahmad and Craig, 1997). One option for 
reducing the vertical fiscal imbalance without reform of tax assignment is to re-assign some 
spending responsibility for goods and services provision from SNGs to the national 
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government. However, experience suggests that mismatch between spending and taxing 
will also provide some balancing role for the national government in fiscal transfers (Bird 
and Smart, 2002).  
Fiscal autonomy of SNGs is fundamental and important feature of fiscal 
decentralisation. However, fiscal autonomy is only one aspect of fiscal decentralisation, 
which also depends on the proportion of national fiscal activity undertaken by SNGs, or 
their “fiscal importance”. 
2.2 Fiscal importance of subnational governments 
The principle of subsidiarity suggests that economic performances of the governments 
will be more responsive to consumer demands and to cost cutting pressures (i.e. more 
efficient) if services are provided by the lowest level of government possible. While foreign 
policy, defence, immigration, and international trade can be best formulated and 
implemented by the national government, SNGs are able to carry out some important tasks 
for regional and local communities such as law, order and public safety, education, health 
policy, as well as very local issues such as street lighting system, local sewerage, garbage 
collection, and local paper deliveries, etc. Services provided by the national government are 
consistent with the law of subsidiarity when demand is at a constant level across various 
subnational localities. However, when demand varies from location to location, national 
provision to the common standard leads to inefficient under-provision, in some areas, and 
inefficient over-provision, in other areas. In short, services provided by the national 
government assume tastes and preferences to be homogeneous across locations and for 
citizens within locations.  
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SNGs operate closely to local inhabitants so that they are the sole agents, who are in 
the best position to understand preferences, tastes and amount demanded. It is clear that 
levels of goods and services provided should not exceed the amount demanded by the 
community. This can avoid both under or overprovision of public goods and services. 
Moreover, a system of fees, users’ charges can be considered useful and effective for the 
purpose of cost recovery (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). The larger the portion of 
the total public spending cake attributable to SNGs, the higher the degree of fiscal 
importance and the more likely it is that the benefits from the law of subsidiarity will be 
realised.  
2.5 Potential weaknesses of the Vo (2010)’s fiscal decentralisation index 
Any form of the currently available fiscal decentralisation index has two potentially 
significant limitations. Firstly, revenue and expenditure in each SNG are implicitly 
assumed to be equal. In effect, all regions are assumed to be a homogeneous fiscal mass. 
However, SNGs typically involve large differences in revenue and spending -- differences 
that could have significant implications for fiscal decentralisation. Secondly, the structure 
of the fiscal constitution is ignored. Subnational governments are not differentiated by type 
– state governments are not distinguished from local governments. These structural changes 
may also impact on fiscal decentralisation. For example, local councils have different 
distributions of revenue and spending within the same state. Furthermore, population, 
revenue, and expenditure across states are also different.  
A fiscal decentralisation index accounts only for the fundamental influences of the 
fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments while ignoring the 
impact of fiscal differences between them, it can only be considered as a “first 
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approximation”. To redress these shortcomings, the fiscal decentralisation index will be 
extended by using information theory as developed by Theil (1967). The main goals of the 
extensions of the first approximation index are to account for the distributions of revenue 
and expenditure shares of all governments (including local governments) between the state 
jurisdictions (in the second approximation) and the distribution of revenue and expenditure 
shares of all governments within a state jurisdiction (in the third approximation). The 
concepts of “between-set entropy” and “within-set entropy” appear to have the potential to 
account for heterogeneity in fiscal shares across different levels of governments.  
3. Vietnam and fiscal decentralisation 
The choice of Vietnam is for convenience because we can investigate and collect data 
at 3 levels of government: central; provincial and district levels of government using local 
data sources which are only available in Vietnamese. These types of data are generally not 
available from the international data sources such as the IMF, the World Bank, or the ADB.  
In addition, we firmly believe that countries with significant difference of revenue raising 
capacities such as Vietnam can be effectively used for the analysis using this framework as 
an illustration on how disparity of revenue and expenditure at subnational levels including 
provincial and district levels can significantly affect the degree of fiscal decentralisation of 
the country. 
Policy measures to increase fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam were being set in place 
from the mid 1990s, especially through the introduction of the Budget Laws of 1997, 1999, 
2004 and 2014. The specific changes in the tax assignment and tax allocation across the 
national government and SNGs that have increased fiscal decentralisation since 1990 are 
observed in the revisions of the budget laws. 
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In Vietnam, exclusively national government taxes include export–import duties and 
excise tax. The shared taxes between the national government and SNGs consist of the 
value added tax; corporate income tax; and personal income tax. Many minor taxes are 
allocated as SNGs’ own-sourced taxes such as tax on transfers of properties, licence tax, 
agricultural tax, land and housing tax, and tax on land use rights. Importantly though, 
regardless of whether a tax is a national tax or shared tax, the tax bases and rates are 
centrally determined. In view of this, it is evident that the assignment and allocation of 
taxes in Vietnam since 1990, has dealt primarily with the issue of the “fiscal importance” of 
SNGs – that is, with the share of total public sector expenditure undertaken by SNGs.  
Personal income tax - a shared tax after the introduction of the 1997’s Budget law is 
something of a special case in Vietnam. International experience has shown that personal 
income tax usually generates a significant share of total taxation revenue in many countries. 
However, this is not the case in Vietnam. Maintaining the personal income tax as a shared 
tax may well be seen by the national government as prudent, particularly if Vietnam needs 
to implement any requirements imposed by the World Bank on debt management and from 
the World Trade Organisation.   
Shared taxes between the national government and SNGs provide an interesting 
example of the mechanism by which the fiscal importance of SNGs increases over time. 
With a well-endowed region with the expected revenue that is greater than its minimum 
expenditure need, revenue from shared taxes must be transferred to the national budget at 
the rate to be centrally determined, whereas less well endowed provinces receive all 100 
percent of shared tax revenue. 
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Like other developing countries, Vietnam suffers from the fiscal imbalance in both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. The country has an implicit system of equalisation 
grants, although it is very partial in character. A partial and unsystematic form of fiscal 
equalisation applies in Vietnam on the basis of the difference between the expected revenue 
and the minimum expenditure need of SNGs. Expected revenues for a SNG are determined 
by: (i) the subnational branch of tax administration, on the basis of the actual revenue 
collections of the previous years, taking into account changes in tax policies in the year and 
(ii) expected economic growth rate during the year. The minimum expenditure needs of 
SNGs are calculated on the basis of the expenditure norms determined by the national 
government (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004, p.26). The difference between expected revenue and 
minimum expected expenditure need have laid the foundation for the national government 
to decide the tax sharing rates which are applied to revenue from the shared taxes between 
national government and SNGs. If the expected revenue (revenue from both own-sourced 
and shared taxes) is less than its minimum expenditure need, then all proceeds from shared 
taxes are kept at subnational budget.  
Under this arrangement, fiscal transfers are partially achieved through shared tax 
revenue arrangements. The major proportion of any remaining intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers in Vietnam is in the form of conditional transfers in which SNGs have to follow 
national requirements on how these funds are expended. As a result, fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs on fiscal transfers is also very limited. This conclusion is also accurate on SNGs 
borrowings because SNGs are not generally allowed to arrange borrowings at their own 
discretion. 
 
4. Entropy and revenue/expenditure inequality 
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In his influential study, Theil (1967) advocated the use of entropy-based measure for 
the analysis of income inequality. In this section, we apply Theil’s notion of the entropy to 
public finance in multi-tiered governments. The analysis that follows is devoted to the 
development of an analytical framework which reveals SNGs’ fiscal inequality in term of 
revenue shares among SNGs. The same framework can be directly applied to the 
expenditure shares among SNGs. The notion of fiscal inequality (or fiscal dispersion) is 
important for fiscal theory on decentralisation because it accounts for the heterogeneity of 
various subnational units in terms of revenue and expenditure shares. However, it should be 
emphasised that fiscal inequality and fiscal equalisation are two distinct concepts, in that 
fiscal equalisation is not designed to redress the notion of fiscal inequality in this chapter. 
Specifically, the concept of fiscal inequality relies on “money” (such as revenue and 
expenditure of subnational governments) as the unit of comparison, whereas the fiscal 
equalisation process (such as that adopted in Australia) is concerned with equalising the 
capacity of SNGs to provide the same “real” level of service. 
It is assumed that a country has Q states (the second level of governments) and P 
local councils (the third level of governments) and each local council belongs to one state. 
Then N P Q= +  is the total number of local and state governments, the number of 
subnational governments (SNGs). Each SNG accounts for a non-negative fraction of total 
subnational revenue, to be denoted by ir  which for short we shall refer to as the “regional 
revenue share”. The sum of these all revenue shares is equal to unity: 
1
1, 0 1,..., .N i ii r r i N= =   =  Let r  denote the vector of the revenue shares 1,.., Nr r . 
The entropy of the revenue shares is defined as:  
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 (4.1)     
1
1( ) log .
N
i
i i
H r
r=
=r  
The entropy ( )H r can be regarded as the measure of the equality with which revenue is 
distributed among the SNGs. When the revenue distribution is extremely equal in that each 
SNG has the same revenue share (i.e., 1ir N= ) and the entropy is at its maximum: 
( ) log .H N=r  At the other extreme, if one SNG accounts for all revenue so that others 
have no revenue (i.e., 1ir =  and 0jr =  for i j ), the minimum value of the entropy is 
achieved: ( ) 0.H =r  As a result, the range of the entropy is ( )0 log .H N r  
 In the context of the distribution of revenue, it is more convenient to focus on 
revenue inequality, rather than revenue equality. Revenue inequality can be measured by 
deducting the entropy ( )H r  from its maximum value, log :N  
(4.2)            
1 1
1log ( ) log log log .
N N
i i i
i ii
N H N r r Nr
r= =
− = − = r  
Due to the constraints on the range of the entropy ( ) ,H r  it is clear that the range of this 
measure of revenue inequality is 0  -- perfect equality (when ( ) logH N=r ) -- and log N  -
- maximum inequality (when ( ) 0H =r ).   
It is assumed that there are G  sets of SNGs, to be denoted by 1,.., ,GS S  and each 
SNG belongs to one and only one set. Let gN be a number of SNGs in set gS , with 
1
.
G
gg
N N= =  The entropy of revenue shares, equation (3.1), then can be expressed as: 
(4.3)    
1
1( ) log ,
g
G
i
g i i
H r
r= 
 =     Sr  
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where the component inside the square brackets is the entropy of revenue shares within set 
.gS  Let gR  be the sum of revenue shares of all SNGs in set ,gS  ;g igiR r= S  this gR  is 
the revenue share of group g  with 
1
1.G gg R= =  The entropy of revenue shares within set 
gS  can be expressed as: 
1 1 1log log
1 1log log .
g g
g
i
i g
i ii g i g g
i
g g
i g i g g
r
r R
r R r R R
rR R
R r R R
 

  =       
= +
 

S S
S
 
Thus, if we define ( ) 1log ,
g
i
g g
i g i g
rH
R r R
= 
S
r  where gr  is the vector of ir  that fall under 
,gS as the within-set entropy, we have: 
(4.4)    ( )1 1log log .
g
i g g g g
i i g
r R H R
r R
= +
S
r  
Combining equations (4.3) and (4.4), the total entropy becomes: 
 (4.5)     ( )
1 1
1( ) log .
G G
g g g g
g g g
H R H R
R= =
= + r r  
On the right-hand side of this equation, the first component is a weighted average of the 
within-set entropies ( ) ( )1 1 ,..., ,G GH Hr r  with the group revenue shares 1,..., GR R  as the 
weights. The second term on the right of equation (4.5) is the between-set entropy, 
( )1 log 1 .G g gg R R=  
 In the above, we decomposed revenue equality into within-set and between-set terms. 
We now show that revenue inequality can be similarly decomposed.  
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 Recall from equation (4.5) that the entropy is decomposed into two distinct 
components: a weighted average of the within-set entropy and the between-set entropy. 
Furthermore, as in (4.2), inequality is measured by the difference between the maximum 
value of the entropy, log N  and the entropy ( ).H r  Thus, by combining equations (4.2) and 
(4.5), revenue inequality can be expressed as: 
(4.6)    
1 1
1log ( ) log ( ) log .
G G
g g g g
g g g
N H N R H R
R= =
− = − − r r  
The right-hand side of equation (3.6) remains unchanged if we subtract and add 
1
log ,G g gg R N=  where gR  and gN  are the revenue share of and a number of SNGs in set 
,gS  respectively:   
 
( )
1 1
1 1
log ( ) log ( ) log log
1log log log .
g
G G
g
g g g g g
g g g
G G
gi
g g g
g i gg i g g
N
N H R N H N R
R
RrR N R
R r R N N
= =
=  =
− = − + −
 = − +   
 
  
S
r r
 
As the result, revenue inequality can be expressed as follows: 
(4.7)   
1 1
log ( ) log log .
1
g
G G
i g gi
g g
g i gg g g
r R RrN H R R
R N N N=  =
 − = +     Sr  
Result (4.7) reveals that revenue inequality consists of two distinct components: (i) a 
weighted average of within-set inequalities and (ii) a between-set inequality. 
4.1 The within-set inequalities 
The first component of (4.7) is a weighted average of the within-set inequalities: 
 (4.8)     
1
log .
1
g
G
i gi
g
g i g g
r RrR
R N= 
     S   
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The term i gr R  is the conditional revenue share of SNG i  within group ,gS  that is, SNG 
i ’s revenue share within the group. Also, gN  represents a number of SNGs in group .gS  
Equation (4.8) comprises two weighted averages: (a) log ,
1g
i gi
g i
g g
r RrZ
R N
= S  the within-
set revenue inequality for group ,gS  and (b) 1 ,
G
g gg
R Z=  the weighted average of the 
within-set revenue inequalities. 
   
4.2 The between-set inequality 
The second term on the right-hand side of (4.7) is the between-set inequality: 
(4.9)      
1
log .
G
g
g
g g
R
R
N N=
   
The basic ingredient of inequality (4.5) is the contrast between two sets of shares, the 
revenue shares of the G  groups, 1,..., GR R  and the corresponding population shares, 
1 ,..., .GN N N N  If all groups receive their pro-rata shares of revenue based on population, 
i.e. , 1,..., ,g gR N N g G= =  then there is no dispersion of revenue distribution and we 
have perfect between-set revenue equality.  
5. An application of the subnational fiscal disparity framework in Vietnam 
To illustrate the workings and interpretations of the various measures of fiscal 
decentralisation, in this section, we provide some numerical examples. 
It is assumed that SNGs’ own-sourced revenue, subnational expenditure, and national 
government expenditure (excluding fiscal transfers to SNGs) are $293, $412, and $412 
million, respectively, so that total public sector expenditure is $412 + $412 = $824 million 
for a hypothetical country V.  
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An incomplete measure of fiscal decentralisation focusing revenue side indicates that 
the degree of fiscal decentralisation, being the ratio of SNGs’ own-sourced revenue to 
SNGs’ expenditure of country V is 293 412 0.71,=  whereas another incomplete measure 
indicates that the degree can be measured as the ratio between SNGs’ expenditure and total 
public sector expenditure, which is 412 824 0.5= . Other combinations are also possible. 
Vo (2010) argued that the degree of fiscal decentralisation for country V should be the 
geometric mean of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance, which is 
0.71 0.50 0.6,FDI =  =    as indicated by both measures. 
In this paper, we consider that even Vo (2010)’s approach to measuring fiscal 
decentralisation is an advance on current practice, it is still not perfect as it assumes there is 
no dispersion of revenue and expenditure across regions. We also argue that the best 
approach to take into account fiscal dispersion across subnational governments is to utility 
Theil’s entropy rather than any conventional measure of dispersion.  The following 
example illustrates this point. 
Table 1 provides fiscal data on the different distributions of revenue among SNGs 
in countries V and L for the purpose of measuring fiscal dispersion of revenue shares. It is 
assumed that countries V and L consist of four subnational regions: A, B, C and D, each 
with different level of revenue. Column 2 shows that there is one small region in country V, 
region A. Revenue from region B is almost double that of D and forty times higher than 
that of region A. Columns 3 and 4 present the actual and average revenue shares for 4 
regions in country V. By contrast, in country L, there are one large and three small regions. 
In country L, region B accounts for more than 92 percent of the total revenue of all regions, 
and the remaining 8 percent is spread across the three small regions A, C, and D.  
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TABLE 2 
REGIONAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Region 
Country V   Country L 
Revenue Share in total (percent)  Revenue Share in total (percent) 
($ millions) Actual Average  Difference   ($ millions) Actual Average  Difference  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (4) – (3)   (6) (7) (8) 
(9) = 
(8) – (7) 
 A  3 1 25 24  3 1 25 24 
 B  125 43 25 -18  271 92 25 -67 
 C  97 33 25 -8  11 4 25 21 
 D  68 23 25 2  8 3 25 22 
Total 293 100 100 0   293 100 100 0 
 
TABLE 3 
 MEASURING FISCAL INEQUALITY 
Dispersion of shares Country V   Country L 
1. Standard deviation 0.18  0.45 
2. Fiscal inequality 0.12   0.46 
 
 
Row 1 of Table 3 presents the standard deviation of the revenue shares in the two 
countries. As the standard deviation in country V is less than one-half that in country L, 
there is clear less dispersion, or less inequality of the distribution of fiscal revenue across 
subnational government units in country V. Our measure of fiscal inequality is 
( )1 log log1 ,N i iiH r r N= = −  where ir  is the revenue share of SNG i  and 4N =  in this 
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example. Thus as an approximate, we can say that fiscal inequality is about 12 percent in 
country V and 46 percent in country L.  
 
We now turn to the application of this new framework into the Vietnamese context 
using its fiscal data across provinces and districts. 
Table 4 presents the fiscal inequalities across subnational regions in Vietnam in 2015. 
The samples include 61 provinces and metropolises in Vietnam except for Binh Phuoc, and 
Ha Tinh provinces due to the unavailability of data. It is clear that within-province fiscal 
inequality accounts for 81.6 per cent and 93.6 per cent total inequality in terms of revenue 
and expenditure, respectively. This implies that the within-province fiscal inequality plays a 
more important role in total inequality of the distribution of revenue and expenditure across 
subnational regions in Vietnam. This is partly because each subnational region includes 
both provincial and local governments, and the provincial government is significantly 
larger than any local government within the same region. For example, for Ho Chi Minh 
City, the total share Rg = 14.1 per cent in 2013, the state government accounts for 9.9 per 
cent
 
leaving only 4.2 per cent to be divided among the 24 local governments (districts) in 
Ho Chi Minh City. Another implication from the fiscal inequalities is that it is a more 
equality in an allocation of expenditure across subnational regions rather than that of 
revenue. This shows the authority’s efforts to provide citizens a better public goods and 
services equally. 
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TABLE 4 
GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS SUBNATIONAL REGIONS 
VIETNAM, 2015 
 
Inequality measure Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality 0.762  0.625 
 Between-set inequality 0.140  0.039 
 Within-set inequality (WSI) 0.621  0.586 
WSI as the percentage of total inequality 81.6  93.8 
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance 
Figure 1 shows a representative sample of within-set inequality across regions in 
Vietnam in terms of revenue and expenditure. It is apparent that Ha Noi City and Ho Chi 
Minh City, the two largest metropolises in Vietnam, have far higher values as compared to 
other provinces. Other provinces including Ba Ria – Vung Tau, Da Nang, Dong Nai, Nghe 
An, Quang Nam, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Vinh Phuc belong to the group of a relatively 
high within-set inequality. On the contrary, provinces such as Bac Kan, Dak Nong, Dien 
Bien Phu, Ha Nam, Hau Giang, Kon Tum, Ninh Thuan, Tuyen Quang belong to the group 
of a relatively low within-group inequality. 
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FIGURE 1: 
WITHIN-SET INEQUALITY, ACROSS PROVINCES AND METROPOLISES 
VIETNAM, 2015 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance 
 
   
 Total inequality can also be disaggregated in a hierarchical manner in which the two 
sets to be considered are: (i) the upper-level SNGs, the set consisting of the sixty-one 
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provinces and metropolises (cities under direct management of the national government); 
and (ii) the lower-level SNGs, the 678 local councils. Table 5 below presents the results 
when fiscal inequality is decomposed in this way. The results show that when local 
councils and states are completely isolated in this way, the between-set inequality is much 
larger than the within-set inequality. The between-set inequality between the states and 
local councils accounts for about 63.9 per cent of revenue inequality and 84.8 per cent of 
expenditure inequality. 
TABLE 5 
HIERARCHICAL ALLOCATION OF FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENTS, VIETNAM, 2015 
Inequality measure Revenue Expenditure 
Total inequality 0.762 0.625 
 Between-set inequality (BSE) 0.487 0.530 
 Within-set inequality 0.275 0.095 
Inequality within:   
 States governments 0.165 0.079 
 Governments of local councils 0.110 0.016 
BSE as the percentage of total inequality 63.9 84.8 
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance 
6. Concluding remarks 
Economic aspect of fiscal decentralisation has recently attracted a noticeable increase 
in attention from academics and international institutions such as the World Bank. The 
question has been raised how fiscal decentralisation across countries can be measured. The 
main contribution of this paper is the analysis on the composition of fiscal inequality. Fiscal 
inequality can be decomposed into between-set and within-set components.  
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Figure 2 presents a summary of the results of fiscal inequality in Vietnam by 
component. The results reveal that within-set inequality plays a significant role when the 
set is defined on a geographic basis. The insignificance of the between-set inequality for 
regions can be partly explained by the application of fiscal equalisation in Vietnam 
whereby the national government allocates tax revenue among the provinces in a manner 
that gives the provinces equal capacity to provide a standard level of service provided their 
revenue raising (i.e. tax and royalty) is the same. Another reason for the dominance of the 
regional within-set component is that each region contains provincial and local 
governments; and in most cases, the provincial government is substantially larger than local 
governments. By contrast, when groups are defined hierarchically, the between-set 
inequality accounts for about 63.9 per cent of the total inequality. This result reflects the 
fact that provincial governments account for a significant share in total revenue or 
expenditure of subnational governments. 
FIGURE 2 
FISCAL INEQUALITY BY COMPONENT, VIETNAM, 2013 
Geographical Hierarchical 
 
 
 
 
Between-set 
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Within-set 
36.1% 
Between-set 
18.4% 
Within-set 
81.6% 
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Some policy implications have emerged on the ground of the findings from this 
study. Subnational governments in Vietnam are clearly in a very weak position because: (i) 
the national government sets tax bases and tax rates; (ii) tax administration is nationally 
centralised; and (iii) there is a heavy interference on subnational spending programs from 
the national government. That is, under current arrangements, the fiscal autonomy of SNGs 
in Vietnam is very limited, and reform should be aimed at redressing this. A mechanism for 
devolving more responsibility from the national to subnational governments would be 
highly desirable. 
Other factors that could be complementary to constitutional change in affecting an 
increase in fiscal decentralisation include: (i) a relatively greater emphasis by SNGs on fees 
and charges for services compared to “general taxation” (as the former would generally be 
at the discretion of SNGs, while the latter would generally be largely directed by the 
national government); (ii) reduced emphasis on “shared” taxes; and (iii) a (constitutionally 
mandated) reduction in the portion of fiscal transfers from the national government to 
SNGs made in the form of conditional transfers (i.e. tied grants).  
Decomposition of total inequality into between-set and within-set inequalities is one 
of many different techniques of decomposition.  Especially in the research area of income 
inequality where various decomposition techniques are used. As such, further studies may 
need to consider different techniques of decomposition to ensure the robustness of the 
findings. 
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